

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**MANEUVER BRANCH:
A VISION FOR THE FUTURE**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Three significant realities are serving as the catalyst for change of the future Army. They are the fact that we are at war and will remain at war for an undetermined period of time; the transformation to modular Brigade Combat Teams; and the development and acquisition of the Future Combat System (FCS). The scope of this paper examines the traditional Combat Arms branches of Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense and recommends a consolidated Maneuver branch to better serve the organizations of the transformed army and man the Future Combat Systems that will equip the Brigade Combat Teams Unit of Action (BCTUA) of the future. This maneuver branch will consist of three critical functions of dismounted maneuver, mounted maneuver and fires. The requirements to train and assign officers to man these deploying BCTUAs is immediate and without precedent. The demand to train leaders to be adaptable warriors capable of conducting a full range of Joint military operations is an imperative. The Army must consider transforming the existing stove piped "branch" system along with the organizations and equipment.

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MANEUVER BRANCH: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE

We're going to have to change some of the things that made us the best Army in the world. Our values are sacrosanct... everything else is on the table.¹

- Army Chief of Staff
General Peter J. Schoomaker

PRECEDENT FOR CHANGE

Three significant realities are serving as the catalyst for the change of the future Army; they are the fact that we are at war and will remain at war for an undetermined period of time, the transformation to modular Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action (BCTUA) and the development and acquisition of the Future Combat System (FCS). The Army is rapidly transforming and this transformation requires the institutional Army to examine how it recruits, develops and educates a professional Officer Corps with a Warrior ethos inspired to a lifetime of service to serve in BCTUAs equipped with the Future Combat System.²

The Army's modularity effort is an essential aspect of transformation that is designed to provide the Joint Force Commander relevant and ready capabilities and forces from a campaign-quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary mindset.³ The General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC) on OPMS 3 has determined that one of the outcomes of the current transformation process requires changes to the types and numbers of skills that our Officer Corps requires now and in the future. The Officer Corps must remain relevant and ready as warriors first; specialists second to man and lead in BCTUA equipped with emerging technology on todays and future battlefields.⁴

Future Combat System (FCS) is a concept of the systems that will equip the Army's Future Force. The key aspect of the Future Combat System is that it will be a common platform that will harness the development of spiral technology to provide commanders, leaders and soldiers, mobile protected platforms equipped with unsurpassed networking and integrated situational awareness of the battlefield. This capability will exist at all levels of the command and control from the individual soldier level through unit command and joint echelons.⁵

These significant developments call for a total review by the institutional Army of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF). Undoubtedly each component of DOTMLPF will be impacted in some way.

The scope of this paper will examine the traditional Combat Arms branches of Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense and will recommend a consolidated Maneuver branch to

better serve the organizations of the transformed army and man the Future Combat Systems (FCS) that will equip the modular Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action (BCTUA).

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

The single most significant factor of our strategic reality is that we are at war. During 2004 and 2005, eight of our ten active divisions and numerous reserve component separate brigades will rotate in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) or Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), while operations in Korea and other theaters in the Global War on Terrorism will continue for the foreseeable future. Although the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is the Army's near-term focus and our first priority, the Army must also leverage existing momentum to convert the current force to a modular, expeditionary, and more lethal force to respond to future threats.⁶ This must be done while balancing significant competing demands of winning the war we are fighting today while simultaneously posturing for the future challenges. "Our core competencies, however must endure: *to train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders and to provide relevant and ready land power to Combatant Commanders and the Joint Team*".⁷

The progress to date on the transformation of an Army at War is impressive. Every aspect of how the Army functions, organizes, trains, equips, deploys and operates is being challenged, rethought, reorganized and overhauled. With the most recent conversion of the 3d Infantry Division and the 101st Air assault Division, and the ongoing transformation of the 4th Infantry Division and the 10th Mountain Division to four Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action the conditions have been set for the transformation of the entire Army.

THE WAY AHEAD

Currently thirty percent of Active Component brigade combat teams have converted to the modular design. By late 2005 over half of Active Component Brigade Combat Teams will be modular and the Army National Guard (ARNG) will convert 3 BCTS to the modular design and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) will start the conversion to Army Expeditionary Force packages.⁸

The strategic plan is that over the next 3 years the active Army will convert to 43 active component Brigade Combat Teams. Over the next 5 years the ARNG will convert to 34 Brigade Combat Teams. This would bring the total capability between the Active Components and ARNG to 77 Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action by Fiscal Year 10 (FY10).⁹

Transformation begins and ends with people. The human dimension of the military's transformation remains the crucial link to both the realization of future capabilities and the enhanced effectiveness of current ones.¹⁰

- Army Transformation Roadmap

THE TRANSFORMED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action (BCTUA) is the base organization in which the former capabilities of the Division would now be found resident. The purpose and intent of the transformation of the BCTUA into modular capabilities-based unit designs is that it will enable greater capacity for rapid packaging and responsive and sustained employment to support combatant commanders. BCTUAs will also enhance the expeditionary and campaign qualities of Army forces by better enabling Joint/coalition operations. The transition to modular BCTUA will also increase the brigade-equivalent forces available to meet both enduring and emerging mission requirements.¹¹

The Heavy Brigade Combat Team, which consists of two Combined Arms Battalions, one Armored Reconnaissance Squadron, an Artillery Strike Battalion, a Forward Support Battalion and a Brigade Troops Battalion. A Combined Arms Battalion consists of a balanced battalion with two tank companies and two mechanized companies. It has an engineer company, a headquarters company, a scout platoon and a mortar platoon. The Armored Reconnaissance Squadron consists of 3 ground cavalry troops, one headquarters troop, and one mortar platoon. The Strike Battalion consists of 2 Paladin Batteries, a headquarters battery and a Target Acquisition Platoon.¹² The Infantry Brigade Combat Team of a Light Division will consist of two Infantry Battalions, one Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition Squadron (RSTA), a Fires Battalion, a Forward Support Battalion and a Brigade Troops Battalion.

Brigade Combat Team Units of Action (BCTUA) equipped with the Future Combat System (FCS) will operate in every spectrum of military operations. The increased situational awareness and networked capabilities of the Future Combat System (FCS) will expand the battlespace from the Brigade down to the platoon level. Leaders will control a new set of unmanned platforms that include remote sensors and Non Line of Sight (NLOS) indirect fire systems. Leaders will be required to operate and lead dismounted, mounted and command and control platforms that deliver direct and indirect fires. The roles of officers leading these units will change dramatically. The requirement to master the combined arms task associated with dominant maneuver will increase. Leaders must be able to adapt to these new systems and exploit their potential capabilities. A maneuver branch will facilitate this adaptation by developing a branch of officers that are introduced to these platforms and concepts at the

inception of their institutional training and further developed by assignments in the Future Combat System (FCS) equipped Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action (BCTUA).

These transformed BCTUA exemplify combined arms organizations. They are designed to be similar in organization and capability to be expeditionary and responsive. The training and manning implications for these organizations are significant. The role of officers leading these units demands a renewed combined arms mentality to master the challenges of the contemporary operating environment while still being able to conduct high intensity operations. The consolidation of roles and combined arms functions to develop an officer corps to lead in these units is critical to the manning and ultimately the professional development of the future commanders of the BCTUA.

With battalions that are designed to be balanced combined arms organizations the question has to be asked, why do we need separate branches of Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense? Instead, should not the Army develop and train a basic skill set of ground maneuver task and then specialize a smaller population of officers to lead fire's platoons and batteries? Mounted and dismounted maneuver platoons and companies can and should be led by an officer that can do both functions. We need combined arms officers capable of leading and staffing the units of the BCTUA. A combined arms approach to a Maneuver branch will better prepare officers at all levels to assume staff and leadership assignments. As company grade officers, Maneuver leaders will have multiple career development leadership and staff opportunities to develop a strong foundation for future service as field grade officers. Field Grade Maneuver branch officers will be much better prepared to serve as primary staff officers, operations officers, executive officers and battalion commanders of a combined arms battalions because of their broadened combined arms experience. The concept of a consolidated Maneuver branch will expand the bench of officers to serve in these critical field grade positions that are significantly increased with the BCTUA design.

A new American way of war has emerged-network-centric operations.¹³

- Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS

The FCS-equipped BCT will consist of three FCS equipped Combined Arms Battalions (CABs), a Non-Line of sight (NLOS) Cannon Battalion, a Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, a Forward support Battalion(FSB), a Brigade Intelligence

and Communications company (BICC), and a Headquarters Company. The FCS equipped BCT will be the Army's future tactical war fighting formation.¹⁴

A test brigade will be selected in the summer of 2005 to be the field evaluation force for the Future Combat System. In a recent Army Times article the TRADOC Commander General Kevin Brynes was quoted as saying that the brigade would begin the process as early as 2006 but not later than 2007.¹⁵ The spiral evolution of the FCS concept will take years. FCS technologies are not expected to be fielded until 2008 to 2016.¹⁶

FCS platforms consist of a total of eighteen individual systems. Eight manned systems, four unmanned air systems, three classes of unmanned ground systems and two unattended sensors/munitions and the Non-Line of Sight- Launch System (NLOS-LS). The manned systems include the infantry carrier vehicle command and control vehicle, mounted combat system, reconnaissance and surveillance vehicle, non-line-of-sight cannon, NLOS mortar, maintenance and recovery vehicle and medical treatment and evacuation vehicle.¹⁷ Essential to the Future Combat System is the Future Combat Systems Network. The FCS network consists of four overarching building blocks. They are the System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE); Battle command (BC) software; communications and Computers (CC); and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) systems.¹⁸ This network is critical because it provides the soldier one common system applied over the fleet of FCS vehicles and platforms. This will significantly enhance the training and cross training of personnel to man and maintain these systems. They include imbedded training systems for the soldier and diagnostics for the logistician to anticipate requirements for resupply.¹⁹

The manned Future Combat Systems are merely a concept at this time. The basic platform and subsystems have yet to be developed. Requirements documents have been written or are being developed and a team of defense industry contractors are working together to develop what will ultimately become the Future Combat System. All the sketches and drawings of the Future Combat System are merely artistic impressions and do not reflect an approved prototype.²⁰

When you closely examine the concept of the FCS equipped Brigade Combat Team and look at the balanced combined arms battalion you see the opportunity to leverage the common platforms and network capabilities to consolidate the task that are required to train the leaders and soldiers that will man, operate, maintain and sustain this fleet. The training implications are enormous. A leader could move from the Command and Control vehicle, Infantry carrier or mounted combat system and be able to Command and Control from any or all of these platforms. The main differences in these vehicles will be the tactical employment of the vehicle

and the fire control system. The fire control system can be taught and trained at the institutional level and the imbedded training systems that these platforms will have on them will simplify on the job training or home station sustainment training developed by master gunners in the combined arms battalions. The common FCS platforms and the FCS network will facilitate and compliment the professional development of a Maneuver officer as he moves into different leadership positions within a Maneuver company.

TRADITIONAL ROLES AND MISSIONS OF INFANTRY, ARMOR, FIELD ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENSE

Prior to suggesting a consolidation or delayering of the roles and functions of four of the combat arms branches and the development of a Maneuver branch, it is important to review how the current branches are structured today. The branches of Infantry Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense are basically represented today in the roles that were born out of the reorganization of the branches during World War II.

The Infantry is the basic ground gaining arm of the Army. "The mission of the Infantry is to close with the enemy by fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel his attack by fire, close combat, or counterattack."²¹ Modern infantryman fight dismounted or mounted on a number of fighting vehicles both tracked and wheeled and are organized in various units consisting of the Airborne, Ranger, Air Assault , mechanized infantry and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.

Armor became a separate branch from the infantry in 1940, tracing its roots to the Cavalry and the American Tank Corps initially part of the Infantry Branch. Contemporary Armor and Cavalry tactics incorporate cohesive and aggressive emphasis upon mobility, firepower, and shock action to overcome an enemy force. The combined arms team concept includes tanks, armored and air cavalry, mechanized infantry/artillery/engineers, and army aviation, all supported by a flexible and swift communications network and a highly mobile and responsive combat service support system.²²

Like the Infantry, the American Field Artillery traces its roots to the Revolutionary War. The modern day mission of the Field Artillery is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire and to integrate all supporting fires into combined arms operations.²³ Field Artillery units are comprised of both towed, self propelled and Multiple Launch Rocket (MLRS) units.

Air Defense branch traces its roots to the Field Artillery and Coastal Artillery. ²⁴ Today's Air Defenders perform a multitude of missions in support of land combat operations ranging from air

defense from enemy aircraft and unmanned aircraft to missile defense using a host of man portable, wheeled, and tracked systems.

These traditional roles are being challenged on a daily basis in Iraq and Afghanistan. Soldiers and leaders have had to break from tradition and adapt to the demands of the battlefield by assuming roles and missions that have traditionally been reserved for Infantry units and organizations. The leaders and soldiers on the battlefield are adapting, and the institutional army should adapt with them to better prepare them for these real world challenges.

ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THEORY: A LOOK AT EMERGING INDUSTRY TRENDS IN CAREER DEVELOPMENT

Organizational science studies of civilian industry have a striking resemblance to the challenges faced by our Army's transformation. Civilian businesses are found to be undergoing organizational transformation, merging, acquiring, growing exponentially, downsizing, delayering, reinventing their missions and undergoing many other fundamental changes. The global economy fueled by information technology has vastly changed the civilian work place environment. The global landscape requires businessmen to have cultural awareness, bilingual or multi-lingual ability, to be adaptive and mentally agile.²⁵ Business leaders that demonstrate these competencies are found to have a greater capacity for adaptability, learning how to learn and make decisions to compete in the global work place.

The emerging studies that constitute the field of organizational science are broadly grouped to include organizational behavior, organizational theory, human resource management and business strategy.²⁶ The trends observed in civilian industry have many direct similarities to the way the army is transforming and the demands of the business world in many ways mirror the demands of military personnel deployed throughout the world conducting the full range of military operations.

The qualities of a desirable business man are much like the qualities the Army desires to develop and train in its leaders. According to an OPMS 3 information paper, "reviews of the current operational environment and AAR's from deployed units have demonstrated there are additional skill sets that will be beneficial to our officer corps in the future. Some of these skills include familiarization with foreign languages, additional regional cultural awareness experience, additional political-military skills, problem solving skills, communication skills, and the keystone skill of leadership."²⁷ It is logical to conclude that any global corporation would make the same assessment of their desired workforce.

In his book Careers in and out of Organizations, Douglas T. Hall has identified what he refers to as the Protean Career path. A protean career path is one of self motivation in which an

employee discovers their calling or passion and serves and thrives with the protean attributes of self invention, passion and job opportunities. The qualities of a protean career path require adaptability, personal identity, social identity and organizational commitment.²⁸ Hall goes on to describe the protean career path in detail, characterized by a life long series of experiences, response learning's, transitions and identity change.²⁹

Hall's protean career path methodology could easily be applied to the US Army. Developing a Warrior Career path applying the principles of the protean model has tremendous potential for the Army. The opportunities to find and develop a passion for your career, self invention, and job opportunities to develop a calling for a lifetime of service are all supported by the Army. A leader could easily pursue the Warrior career path and fit the desired model of professional development and the officer education system that exist today exhibiting the core Army values and Warrior ethos that Army leaders must embrace. The Protean/Warrior model supports many of the ongoing Army initiatives of OPMS 3 review. The concept of developing a leader dedicated to a lifetime of service, with multiple opportunities to grow and learn in the workplace fits the Army model. Periods of transitional education opportunities followed by direct application in the field where a leader would continue to develop, with several opportunities to advance in responsibility, rank and pay all support the Army's Officer Personnel Management System and the Warrior path.³⁰ This path would develop leaders on a focused journey providing them a career that allows an individual the opportunity to pursue several alternate paths to find their calling. Leading and serving in multiple positions with institutional and civilian educational opportunities, continued career progression, advancement and monetary compensation as they are promoted in rank through their career of lifetime service all serve as ways to achieving the goals of the warrior path.

I believe what we need is self aware adaptive leaders and we need self aware adaptive soldiers.³¹

- Army Chief of Staff
General Peter J. Schoomaker

MANEUVER BRANCH

The process of recruiting, training, assigning and developing adaptable maneuver leaders of the future is one of the most immediate imperatives of the institutional Army.³² Officers desiring to lead the formations of the BCTUA must be capable of conducting more than one battlefield function; we cannot allow officers to think of themselves as just Infantry officers, Armor officers, and Air Defenders or Field Artillery men. This is far too parochial and

immediately puts limits on the roles and missions that BCTUA leaders must perform within the spectrum of conflict. Army leaders must think of themselves as combined arms officers capable and willing to adapt and assume the myriad of task and missions that are required on the battlefield. Recruiting officers to the calling to serve in a Maneuver branch and training them to be dismounted maneuver leaders, mounted maneuver leaders and then training a select number of these maneuver leaders to specialize in the fires aspect of maneuver will better prepare leaders to be flexible and adaptable to better serve in the FCS equipped BCTUA. In an effort to describe the Maneuver Branch, I will borrow from the traditional roles of Infantry, Armor, Artillery and Air Defense to frame the role of the Maneuver branch.

The Maneuver Branch would be the basic ground gaining arm of the Army. The mission of the Maneuver branch would be to close with the enemy by fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel his attack by fire, both direct and non line of sight, close combat, or counterattack with aggressive emphasis upon mobility, firepower, and shock action to overcome an enemy force. Soldiers and leaders of the Maneuver branch fight dismounted or mounted according to the mobility means provided and the weapon systems utilized. The Maneuver branch would form the nucleus of the Army's fighting strength around which the other arms and services are grouped.³³ Maneuver officers would embody the imperatives of an agile adaptable leader trained and capable of being an essential member of a Joint Team. These officers would exemplify the warrior ethos and be the core of a future generation of senior leaders.

Maneuver officers would initially be trained in the two distinct functions of the branch, dismounted maneuver and mounted maneuver, then a select group of officers would receive specialized training in the Fires functions of the branch. Leaders assigned to lead Platoons and Fire batteries would attend training to become proficient on the FCS platforms and systems that they will lead and command from to perform the Fires functions of the BCT. These missions would encompass the functions of indirect fire, air defense and missile defense systems and non line of sight platforms that are and will be part of the BCTUA. These platoons would be viewed as specialty platoons much like the current mortar platoon or anti- tank platoon of the past. Maneuver officers leading these formations would have served as dismounted or mounted platoon leaders and then be assigned to leading a Fires platoons within the Combined Arms Battalions of the BCTUA.

Maneuver branch officers would not have to follow a prescribed mounted or dismounted career path. Maneuver branch officers could lead both mounted and dismounted platoons; lead fires platoons, scout platoons within the RSTA Squadron, command mounted or dismounted maneuver troops within a combined arms battalion or a RSTA Squadron. Maneuver branch

officers would also command the Fires batteries within the BCTUA. Maneuver branch officers would have several options throughout their company grade tenure to pursue the career path that they most desire. While the needs of the Army will always be the primary consideration, individual officer requests, professionally developing assignments by battalion and brigade commanders in both staff and command positions will offer multiple opportunities for individual officers to find their calling and passion within the maneuver branch.

War is both a physical reality check and a state of mind. War is ambiguous, uncertain and unfair. When we are at war, we must think and act differently. We become more flexible and more adaptable.

We must anticipate the ultimate reality check – combat.³⁴

- Army Chief of Staff
General Peter J. Schoomaker

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANEUVER LEADERS AND THE ARMY

The roles of Field Artillery and Air Defense have been significantly reduced in the design of the BCTUA and Unit of Employment (UEX). While the capabilities of Field Artillery and Air Defense are still necessary, economies have been taken in these functions and in many cases the personnel are being transitioned to serve and lead in other maneuver functions on the battlefield.

The Contemporary Operating Environment is demanding the mastery of combined arms leadership at the platoon and company level. This task is being done on the job, in the field, under combat conditions by Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense Officers on a daily basis in Iraq today. Armor and Cavalry battalion/Squadrons, Field Artillery battalions and batteries and Air Defense battalions are executing ground maneuver in HUMMV's and dismounted patrols on a daily basis.³⁵ The institutional Army should move to prepare leaders for this essential requirement from the time officers enter the Basic Officer Leader Course system and not at Combat Training Centers (CTC) or Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRE) prior to a combat deployment, or on the job training in a combat zone. While Basic Officer Leader Courses are rapidly integrating lesson learned from OIF and OEF to their course curriculums, training leaders in both mounted and dismounted skills in one basic branch from the onset of commissioning is the best solution.

The leaders of the transformed Brigade Combat Teams must be adaptive and capable of conducting a myriad of missions to meet the demands of a Joint, expeditionary Army. The manning of the modular BCTUAs requires a reexamination of the way we prepare officers to

lead and serve as staff officers in these units. At the company grade level an officer with a basic skill set of maneuver, both mounted and dismounted would be ideally suited to assume command of the platoons of a combined arms battalion. Through experiential and institutional development officers would then be developed to assume command of the companies of a combined arms battalions of the BCTUA. Maneuver branch officers would serve in the bulk of the brigade and battalion staff positions and demonstrate a much greater skill set and be better prepared to assume primary staff positions as Field Grade officers because of their combined arms career development.

Leaders selected to command battalions, squadrons and brigades would come from a much larger bench of officers that have been professionally developed and educated throughout their career. As the selection pyramid gets smaller to battalion and brigade command truly the best the Army has to offer would be selected to assume command of these critical leadership positions. Selection for command of combined arms battalions and command of brigades would be based on demonstrated performance and potential of a bench of Maneuver officers, and not by which stove piped branch they were assessed into as second lieutenants. Current BCTUA command positions and Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) positions eliminate opportunities for Artillerymen, Aviators and Air Defenders to command these formations and the brigade command positions for Armor officers are limited to only heavy brigades.³⁶ To overlook the quality of combined arms officers for these crucial leadership positions is a critical failure to recognize and select from the best bench available

The bottom line is that creating a Maneuver branch would give tremendous flexibility to the professional development and assignment of officers within transformed BCTUAs. A Maneuver branch would develop adaptive leaders that are capable of leading diverse formations throughout their career and give Maneuver branch officers several combined arms leadership and assignment options throughout their lifetime of service.

A Maneuver branch would also foster a professional Officer Corps with extraordinary camaraderie, inspired to a lifetime of service to serve in BCTUAs equipped with the Future Combat System. The Maneuver branch officer corps would be relevant and ready as maneuver warriors first and specialists second to man and lead these units. The professional development of a Maneuver officer would be unprecedented by the lifetime of educational and direct application experiences that would establish a foundation to serve in positions of increased responsibility throughout the Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action, and ultimately the Joint Force.

The roles and missions of the current TRADOC schools would need to be analyzed to determine their fit into this vision. It may be prudent to merge functions of the current TRADOC institutions and take advantage of the opportunities that consolidation has to offer. State of the art classrooms, ranges, training aids and facilities could all be potentially resourced from a consolidation of the Maneuver branch institutional training facilities and sites. Doctrine development and tactics, techniques and procedures would require revision as the Future Combat System evolves and new capabilities are integrated in the way the Army maneuvers to dominate future battlefields. The future is an exciting one; a Maneuver branch will attract a group of recruits that will serve in one of the most dynamic battlefield formations ever seen.

CONCLUSION

This vision of a Maneuver branch is not an original thought. Several senior army leaders have suggested that this is the path of the future. I have attempted to “hang some meat on the bones” of this vision. I strongly feel that it’s time has come. This is no longer a good idea, it is an imperative.

The institutional Army should be out forward leading this initiative. Every branch in the Army should be relooked to see how it supports the Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action and Units of Employment (UEX) of the future. Parochialism, nay sayers and those mired in the past glories of the branches need to set aside their assumptions and agendas for the betterment of the Army. Some have suggested that instead of this movement towards generalization that their needs to be greater specialization with their branches and functional areas. This is not a cookie cutter recipe, an introspective bottom up review and task analyses are essential to this process. Some branches will fit the design to consolidate functions for training and management while other will need to remain specialized and further defined to meet the demands of a Joint and expeditionary Army.

This vision does not intend to undermine the complexity of being a combined arms maneuver leader. Leading soldiers in combat is a tough business, mastering the complexities of dismounted maneuver, mounted maneuver and fires is hard. I recognize these challenges but am convinced and consoled that our officer corps and the bench of officers that are serving our nation now and in the future are up to the task. They want to be challenged, they want to be trained and afforded these leadership opportunities and they will excel. One does not have to look to far to see the current corps of officer serving in Iraq and Afghanistan to see that they are up to the challenge of adapting and revolutionizing the way we fight and wage war. These officers and soldiers will embrace this opportunity and they will amaze the world at their

adaptability and ability to master these difficult task. The bench is assembled and they are saying, "put me in coach".

The concept of a Maneuver branch compliments several of the initiatives developed by the OPMS 3 GOSC. It will functionally align the branches of infantry, Armor, Field Artillery and Air Defense; reinforce TRADOC roles in officer education complimenting current initiatives such as BOLC III and the initiatives to inject agility into the Captains career courses. This vision supports a new career development model that will serve to professionally develop officers to assume Joint qualification opportunities prior to assuming tactical brigade commands.³⁷ It will also provide Department of the Army selection boards a bench of highly qualified officers to select the very best based on skills and experience to command the battalions and BCTUAs of the Army. This vision also compliments the OPMS 3 initiative to effectively integrate and recruit officers with the requisite skills to serve as Maneuver officers by offering prospective recruits multiple career paths.

The transformation of the Army must continue *to train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders and to provide relevant and ready land power to Combatant Commanders and the Joint Team*. A combined arms Maneuver branch fulfills this vision and will serve as the core of a future generation of senior leaders that will be experts in Joint combined arms warfare capable of leading soldiers and taking the fight to our enemies and winning our nations future wars.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Peter J. Schoomaker, "Arrival Message," available from <<http://www.army.mil/leaders/csa/messages/2003Aug01.html>>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2005.

² COL Douglas McCallum, *Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) Review: Summary Information Paper* (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 12 December 2004), 1. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

³ Army, *Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, n.d.), 4-5.

⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁵ Dennis Steele, "Hooah Guide to the Future Combat System," *Army Magazine* 55 (February 2005): 41.

⁶ Army, *The Way Ahead: Our Army at War...Relevant & Ready* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, n.d.), 1-2.

⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁸ COL Henry St Pierre, "Modularity," briefing, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 25 October 2004, slides 6 and 8. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

⁹ Peter J. Schoomaker, "Opening Statement before the House Armed Services Committee," 9 February 2005; available from <<http://www.army.mil/leaders/csa/testimony/20050209HASC.html>>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2005.

¹⁰ Army, *Transformation Roadmap 2003* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 2003), 8-1.

¹¹ Army Training and Doctrine Command Website, available from <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/FocusAreas/modularity.htm>; Internet; accessed 7 March 2005.

¹² St Pierre, unnumbered backup slide.

¹³ A.K. Cebrowski, *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2003), 28.

¹⁴ Army Program Manager, Unit of Action, *FCS 18+1+1 White Paper* (**City**: 15 October 2004), 2.

¹⁵ Matthew Cox and Alex Neill, "Brigade Will Evaluate FCS Capabilities," *Army Times*, 28 February 2005, p. 10.

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Army Program Manager, 2.

¹⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹⁹ Ibid., 7.

²⁰ Mr. Bill White, Program Manager, Unit of Action, Operations Director, telephone conversation with author, 7 March 2005.

²¹ Lawrence P. Crocker, LTC, US Army (Ret.), *Army Officers Guide*, 45th ed. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1990), 503.

²² Ibid., 491.

²³ Ibid., 500.

²⁴ Ibid., 488.

²⁵ Douglas T. Hall, *Careers In and Out of Organizations* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2002), 4.

²⁶ Ibid., ix.

²⁷ LTC Patrick Terrell, *Recruit and Retain the Right Officer: Information Paper #11* (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 12 December 2004). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

²⁸ Hall, chap 6.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ McCallum.

³¹ GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, quoted in Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Adapt or Die, the Imperative for Creating a Culture of Innovation in the Army*, videorecording. (Fort Monroe: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, January 2005).

³² CSM Keith Preston, quoted in Ibid.

³³ Crocker, 488-506.

³⁴ Schoomaker.

³⁵ Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004.

³⁶ COL Timothy Reese, "Modularity Command Impact," briefing, Fort Knox, KY, October 2004. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

³⁷ McCallum

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